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Abstract

In this article, I address the importance of finding tangible and viable solutions in minimizing
susceptibility to online disinformation. I identify three main types of causal factors that lead to
susceptibility: political, psychological, and technical; recognizing the implications of political
polarization, news media, cognitive phenomena, algorithms, and online behavior that leads to
saturation and susceptibility to false information. I argue that by thoroughly compartmentalizing
causal variables into three main factors, each can then be addressed and solved in their own
unique way. I analyze each factor, deriving reinforcing theories and evidence from various
articles, experiments, and publications. I propose that universalizing online regulations and
policies, reforming social media algorithms from less biased developers, lessening online
activity, and training ideologically impartial journalists and users to reverse more immediate and
prominent causal factors. I predict that each solution will naturally saturate into each factor if
successful. I conclude by addressing the severity of online disinformation and that similar or
adjacent proposals will accelerate the fight against disinformation.
Keywords: disinformation, propaganda, fake news, polarization, susceptibility, algorithms,
behavior
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INTRODUCTION
Information has always been a potent factor in everyday life; in an ever-increasing globalized
world, populations are attuned to the rapidly growing consumption of information from
seemingly endless news and social media sources which we tend to base much of our opinions
and assumptions on. Information itself is a powerful tool that has proven through history to make
and break powerful groups and figures, turn the tides of behavioral consensus, and change the
perspectives of everyday life. The very means by which information can be accessible to the
public has been ever-evolving for centuries, with new and advanced communication technologies
being implemented by the most cutting-edge technology companies. Now in the modern age of
the online digital world and the intensifying dependence on machines and social media,
information has become instantaneously accessible to anyone with a cellphone and web
connection. Since the early 1990’s, our social structures have shifted dramatically away from
community-level, face-to-face interactions and toward online interactions. Online social media
such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter have dramatically increased the amount of social
information we receive and the rapidity with which we receive it. 1 However, with so much of an
abundance of information literally at one’s fingertips, how can one precisely decide which
information is the most authentically accurate? With this surge in the amount of information
available so rapidly and continuously, it is almost impossible to completely filter and keep track
of it all. One is simply a Google search away from articles, blogs, opinion pieces, and websites
that not all come from credible sources. Without the proper utilization of proper fact-checking
and research, misinformation too often leaks into our peripheral vision and online activity. False
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information that is not presented in an ironic or parodying entity has led to detrimental and
damaging results if not kept in check. But while misinformation is categorized as wrongful
information that simply may not have been properly fact-checked or researched, possible results
of unintentional human error, disinformation is by contrast a different and more malicious entity.
Disinformation is identified as intentionally false information which is meant to mislead,
confuse, or distort objective facts, news, and information. The term propaganda falls into a
similar category but differs in the sense that propaganda can actually spread truthful information
occasionally while also knowingly withholding certain truthful information to justify a certain
agenda based on those implementing it. Both disinformation and propaganda are meant to garner
public attention, alter perception, and pivot selected information, but disinformation specifically
focuses on upright fake and false facts to distort the reality of a situation. Steps have been taken
in cooperation with leading tech companies and legislation in implementing proper policies and
regulations, but the approximate pace required for such laws to take effect is unfortunately too
slow and cannot keep up with the influx of new technology and the surge of information and
misinformation online. Loosening user regulations and activity on online platforms is
problematic given that most of the population spends not just an alarming rate online on a
weekly or even daily basis, but the majority depend on websites and apps for everyday use.
According to a 2018 report from the Pew Research Center, over two-thirds of Americans get
their news from social media platforms 2 with one-quarter of adults estimated to be online in
some way, shape, or form nearly all the time. 3
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POLITICAL CONTENT
Within the realm of social media activity, 66% of social media users are engaged in politicalrelated posts, a majority compared to all other forms of content combined. 4 In a comparison of
subject matters that disinformation is spread through, political-related content is overwhelmingly
the highest estimate among social media platforms at 71%. 5 The high abundance of political
disinformation through social media platforms is at least recognized as an epidemic within itself.
Brooke Auxier at the Pew Research Center conducted a survey in 2020 finding that nearly 64%
of Americans agreed that social media has had a negative effect on the spread of political
information. 6 Those surveyed expressed concern over users believing everything they see online
or not even being sure of what content to believe. Among the participants, Democrats were about
three times as likely as Republicans to say these sites had a mostly positive impact (14% vs. 5%)
and twice as likely to say social media had neither a positive nor negative effect (32% vs. 16%).
Only about 10% of Americans believed that social media had a mostly positive effect on
everyday life with one-quarter in that 10% believing that social media helps them stay informed
and aware. If such a vast majority of the public are aware and agree that social media harbors
damaging disinformation, why then are so many people susceptible to their tools and tricks used
for manipulation?
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POLITICAL DISINFORMATION
Many would argue that due to the rising awareness of the existence and implementation of fake
news, the public should be able to distinguish true news from false ones. However, even within
the context of the everyday general consumer, only 9% of users say that they are confident in
authenticating true articles. 7 When participants at the Pew Research Center were asked to
identify six sources in 2020, nearly 23% could not properly identify them. Many Americans say
that following the news is “very important” 8 to being a good citizen, and those who say this are
more likely than others to overestimate their news consumption when their survey responses are
compared with passive data tracked on their devices. The spread of political disinformation is
statistically clear as demonstrated by Canadian journalist Craig Silverman, who found that the
top twenty fake news stories in the three months before the 2016 election were shared or liked a
total of 8.7 million times on Facebook. Over the same period, the top twenty news stories from
reputable sources got only 7.3 million Facebook shares or likes. 9 In correlation with a study
published in Science, MIT researchers found that false news and lies spread significantly more
quickly online than truthful information. 10 A prominent example revolves around a false story
that was published in The Denver Guardian mere days before the American 2016 Presidential
election. Written by Californian resident Jestin Coler, the article titled “FBI Agent Suspected in
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Hilary Email Leaks Found Dead in Apparent Murder-Suicide” was completely fabricated, but
was shared over a hundred times a minute shortly after its publication. In an analysis of Coler’s
effective implementation of his fake news article, he had succeeded in capitalizing on people’s
desire to think deeply, tugging on the same cognitive mechanisms that spur critical thinking.
Coler effectively exploited the leveraging of social media and political garbage to spread
conspiracy theories to his liking. 11 The influx of biased, false information is churned out from
unreliable sources at an accelerating rate. Researchers from Nature Communications led by
Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia deduced that low-credibility sources publish an average of 100
articles per week. 12 The popularity distribution of false articles and fact-checked articles are
typically indistinguishable from each other, meaning that false information is just as likely or
even more so to spread alongside real information.
In order to properly form and articulate tangible solutions to the disinformation epidemic, the
purpose of this thesis will be to identify and examine key contributing causal factors that
ultimately lead to susceptibility to online disinformation. On the following pages, I will provide a
critical review of various sources examining polarization, biases, technology, and cognitive
phenomena in understanding susceptibility to online disinformation. From the compiled research
and analysis of a wide variety of publications and peer-reviewed articles, the bulk of most causes
can be classified into three main factors: political factors, psychological factors, and technical
factors. Each of the classified factors will be further broken down and explained not only how
they each cause susceptibility individually, but how they relate and contribute toward one
another that make up grander constructs that propel online disinformation. Once all relevant
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literature is properly examined, we can then provide possible analysis and recommendations for
combating susceptibility to online disinformation based on the results of the following published
literatures on this topic.

LITERATURE REVIEW

POLITICAL FACTORS AND POLARIZATION
When examining contributing factors to susceptibility to political-related disinformation
specifically, we must scrutinize the effects of the already heated environment of the political
landscape; particularly as it pertains to the American two-party system. Those who pull closer
toward either end of the spectrum will undoubtedly have more dissenting views when compared
to those on the other end of the ideological spectrum. As such, political polarization has driven
increasingly negative views towards opposing parties. In a public poll conducted by the Pew
Research Center in 2019, results found that 87% of those who identify with the Republican party
view the Democratic Party unfavorably. The same is nearly mirrored with 88% of identified
Democrats who view the Republican party unfavorably. In both parties, the shares of partisan
identifiers with unfavorable impressions of the opposing party are at or near all-time highs. 13
With the political climate becoming consistently more heated with the results of every passing
election, the ideological extremes have begun to harbor increasing resentment towards the other.
As you can see from the data compiled by the Gallup World Poll in Figure 1, the tense distrust
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within the two opposing parties has greatly affected the levels of confidence in the honest
outcomes of the past US elections.

Figure 1

Six in 10 Americans Do Not Have Confidence in the Honesty of U.S. Elections

Note. Figure taken from RJ Reinhart “Faith in Elections in Relatively Short Supply in U.S.”
Gallup February 13, 2020

The results of the poll actually visualize the increasing gap in those who are confident in the
honesty of elections. Note that this gap and pattern really begins to symmetrically take shape at
the start of the 2010’s, around the same time where the most influential social media sites used
today began to take off in popularity over the years since as compiled by Our World in Data in
Figure 2. I suggest adding a descriptive title to all Figures.


Figure 2
Number of people using social media platforms, 2004 to 2018

Note. Figure taken from Esteban Ortiz-Ospina “The Rise of Social Media” Our World In Data
September 18, 2019

Rather unanimously, the buildup and conclusion of the 2016 US election led to the widest
chasm in confidence among citizens in Figure 1, an election that truly divided America down the
middle within the two parties. Since then, rather than a consistent flow predating 2016, there has
been a sharp rise and fall with each passing year. By 2020, only 14% of Americans were fully
confident that the election that year would be conducted fairly and accurately. 14 Seeds of doubt
have already begun to grow into cynical distrust of opposing parties that only fuel the biases of
misinformation. It appears that the more one side views the other side more negatively, the more
that they will feel the need to justify their own and become convinced that their side is more just,
creating further biases in an all-or-nothing mentality.
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In a society heavily influenced by the choices and actions of those in the executive office and
the policies implemented in legislation, aspects of everyday life have gradually become more
politicized. In an age of shifting social norms and political correctness, the polarizing reactions
by the general public have propelled those with differing views to seek solace online with those
who help to reinforce their positions. Researchers Cameron Brick, Lee De-Wit, and Sander Van
Der Linden from Berkeley College conducted a study, measuring how much aligned political
beliefs have seeped into everyday life. They tested participants who were tasked with
categorizing geometric shapes, and were encouraged to seek help from their peers if they
struggled. The results showed that the participants preferred to seek advice from people who
shared their political views despite the task being not political in any form. 15 Participants found
those they reached out to be more competent and helpful, reinforcing the increased negative
viewpoints of opposing political parties.
The amount of online content propelled by politically-motivated subjects has become so
consistent that nearly 55% of social media users say they are “worn out” by the influx of politics
in their feed. 16 Conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2020, Monica Anderson and Brooke
Auxier additionally found that most social media users do not find common ground with other
online users due to heated online discussions about politics. Roughly 72% of participants said
that discussing politics on social media with people they disagreed with actually led them to find
that they had less in common than they had expected.
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One would think that exposure to opposing views would help in building understanding and
tolerance to dissenting opinions, but the case is actually the opposite according to an experiment
done by the National Academy of Sciences. Using online bots to inject dissenting views into
participants' social media feeds on Twitter, the results found that after viewing and following the
differing political feeds from the bots, Republican participants expressed having more
conservative views after following the liberal bot. The same outcome occurred with the
Democrat participants who expressed slightly more liberal views after following the conservative
bot. There is a growing concern that such forums exacerbate political polarization rather than
patch it because of social network homophily, or the well-documented tendency of people to
form social network ties to those who are similar to themselves. 17
This in turn correlates to the ‘backfire effect’ as coined by researchers Brendan Nyhan and
Jason Reifler who observed that when certain online content is flagged as false and later
changed, viewers become less convinced of proper content filtering and are rather more
convinced that some kind of agenda or conspiracy took place in order to hide certain content
from the public. 18 That level of mistrust in elections speaks volumes to the amount of increasing
distrust in government, corporations, and dissenting online content. Even when steps are being
taken to address political misinformation, the ideology of the flagged content will generate
further distrust and resentment from those supporting parties more than anything else.
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NEWS OUTLETS
Further distrust is occurring now, particularly as it pertains to news outlets that have their own
biases towards one end of the ideological spectrum or the other. Mark Jurkowitz, Amy Mitchell,
Elisa Shearer, and Mason Walker of the Pew Research Center focused on this perspective of
trust and mistrust in a survey of adults in 2019. The results showed that Republicans' views on
heavily relied sources across a range of platforms were overwhelmingly seen as untrustworthy.
At the same time, Democrats see most of those sources as credible and rely on them to a far
greater degree. 19 The results of the survey suggest that Republicans are more likely to believe
conspiracy theories from less reliable sources but Democrats are more likely to trust mainstream
sources; being more confident but less likely to spot disinformation. It will be especially evident
when it comes to sources and outlets that support their own political party ideology.
In examining biases, Ad Fontes Media produced a media bias chart for many of the most
popular online news sources as seen in Figure 3. By categorizing said sources by their political
biases as well as their reliability and quality, we see an inverted bell curve rising and falling
within the two political extremes. As expected, there is an abundance of sources that range
throughout the ideological spectrum. Notice how the most neutral-leaning sources fall within the
“Original Fact Reporting” and “Fact Reporting” sections in the top middle of the chart. As we
gradually pull out towards either end of the extremes, their sources become less credible and
accurate. Many of the sources on the outer end of the curve generate successful clicks and views
annually, proving that those on the ideological extremes with higher biases are consuming
information from less reputable sources. A recent meta-analysis by Ditto in 2019 summarized
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studies in which participants were presented with information that contradicted their political
beliefs and found that liberals and conservatives were equally biased in their acceptance of
opposing data.

Figure 3
Media Bias Chart

Note. Figure taken from Stuart Vyse “Who Are More Biased: Liberals or Conservatives?”
Skeptical Inquirer March 19, 2019

Researchers at Belmont University assembled a similar graph pairing online news content with
their political leaning and credibility as seen in Figure 4. As expected, the more complex sources
are those that display minimum partisan bias and are deemed less sensational or clickbait
compared to the less credible and far-leaning sources located in the bottom corners. As its name
suggests, clickbait articles and images from these sources need to be capable of capturing the


viewer's eye and attention long enough to generate views and revenue. Typically, a catching title
or a popping (sometimes photoshopped) image of a political figure from the dissenting party will
propel in capturing audience attention long enough to share their proposed information, real or
otherwise. The more neutral news outlets like The Wall Street Journal know their audience
enough to minimize visual manipulation, but the lack of surface-level novelty and no ideological
bench to bounce off of keeps more credible sources from reaching a wide-enough audience as it
should. Those with persistent left or right views, and hence more of a consistent ideological
identity, will garner more views and attention.

Figure 4
Leaning and Credibility Chart

Note. Figure taken from Lila D Bunch Library “Keepin' It Real: Tips & Strategies for Evaluating
Fake News” Belmont University August 30, 2021

Political parties in the US that are consistent in fully left or fully right leanings are gradually
increasing in presence and influence, particularly more than mixed parties; parties that share


ideological qualities from either end. In the past two decades the percentage of consumers who
consistently hold liberal or conservative beliefs jumped from 10% to 20%. The number of
Americans who view the opposing party as “a threat to national wellbeing” doubled in the past
decade. 20 Such a dramatic perspective towards members under the same country has
undoubtedly led to the rise in violent protests, riots, and attacks on government officials.

ECHO CHAMBERS
As individuals continue to seek justification for their own ideological beliefs, they gradually
align themselves with like-minded individuals who simply agree and regurgitate what they
already perceive as true. Confined within the tight atmosphere of the echo chamber effect, shared
consistent values that are never questioned within the confines of a particular online
environment, viewers are never being exposed to other points of view that may give objective
facts more dimension and weight.
In an observation of Democrat and Republican activity, members from the Pew Research
Center found little overlap in the types of sources they each turn to and trust. Those with
consistent ideological views seek sources that are distinct from more neutral and mixed sources;
sources that are more neutral and credible as categorized by the above-mentioned figures. The
results of the study found that consistent conservatives were more tightly connected to only a
handful of news sources and expressed greater distrust in two-thirds of popular news sources and
were more likely to be in online groups with opinions that aligned with their own. Consistent
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liberals were found to be less unified in media loyalty, expressed more trust in popular news
sources, and were more likely to block or unfriend people on social media who opposed their
political beliefs. Both sides had constructed their own manifestations of the echo chamber effect
with consistent conservatives limiting themselves to groups they agree with and consistent
liberals simply blocking out or ignoring groups they don’t agree with. The researchers found that
those at both ends of the spectrum combined makeup roughly 20% of the population and have a
greater impact on the political process. 21
Based on the combined results previously discussed, this means that nearly a quarter of the
general population is considered to hold more biased ideological views which will in turn skew
their ability to deduce the authenticity of political-related content. The solution then would be to
free those entrapped within their online echo chambers and to be more open to dissenting points
of view. This process is tricky and delicate as expressed earlier by Brendan Nyhan, Jason Reifler,
and those at the National Academy of Sciences with their results showing that viewing dissenting
information can garner the opposite effect.
How then can we sway the opinions of more headstrong individuals set in their ways? While
the overall majority of the population collectively remain within their affiliated parties, it is not
only common to see sudden switches right before and after term elections, but a particular shift
has been on the rise since 2016. In a study conducted in 2021, researchers Sean Bock and
Landon Schnabel discovered that although most partisans remained stable in their identifications,
a significant proportion of respondents either shifted to the opposing party or became
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independents. 22 While 70% of partisans remained in their lanes between 2016 and 2020, a rather
significant portion of Democrats and Republicans (around 10%) had swayed to the opposite
party. Nearly 15% of both parties in 2016 went on to identify as Independents in 2020. This is
not to suggest that simply switching political parties will improve or diminish one’s
susceptibility to disinformation, but if a driving factor of susceptibility is political bias, Bock and
Schnabels’ results show that openness to dissenting views are not only slowly seeping through,
but are enough to persuade opinions.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
Compared to the more instinctual habits of more primitive mammals, human beings are often
regarded as rational and intuitive. This unique evolutionary phenomenon has gifted us with the
ability to analyze, contemplate, and reflect most given situations, other individuals, and even
ourselves. Despite these evolved traits made to improve both our survival instincts and
understanding of the world around us, we are often fooled and duped not just by misinformation,
but by misunderstandings, misinterpretations, and distorted reflections and memory.
Misinformation excels not only by its complex and brilliant autonomous implementation and
presentations (see Technical Factors) but by exploiting our more cognitive and psychological
faults.
These mental hiccups are often the result of our brains’ miscalculated need to rationalize and
justify certain phenomena in our lives that are of our own making. Disinformation itself and
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those implementing it are not the engineers of these mental glitches, but they take advantage of
these opportunistic loopholes our brain function leaves open for them. The following is a
collection of psychological phenomena that present various causal factors that can contribute to
our susceptibility to disinformation.

ILLUSORY TRUTH EFFECT
Individuals' perceptions of memory are major contributors that can affect their deducing
abilities when trying to authenticate facts from lies. One of the most notable of memory exercises
is the repetition of teachings and practices that eventually become second nature and common
normality if habitually repeated enough times. A study in 1977 at Temple University coined a
phenomenon known as the ‘illusory truth effect’ in which statements can generally be regarded
as true as long as the statement has been repeated and exposed for a long-enough period of time.
While we typically evaluate a statement's truth based on the trustworthiness of their sources,
repeated exposure and repetition to disinformation can increase one’s susceptibility regardless of
the source’s credibility. By constantly increasing exposure to disinformation, the perception of
that information to be true increases.

This is why propaganda and indoctrination work so well in the long-term not simply by the
deceptive quality of false content but by the consistency of driving a particular agenda
continuously. Unless properly addressed, the false information will continue to cycle itself within
news media and curricula, eventually earning its place in normalcy and worst-case scenario will
become a fact and common knowledge in everyday life. The cycle of online media exacerbates


the repetition and exposure of such content and allows entire masses into eventually believing
the very content they are continuously exposed to.

According to a 2010 meta-analytic review of the truth effect, while the perceived credibility of
a statements source increases one's perceptions of truth as we might expect, the effect even
persists when sources are unreliable or unclear. The illusory truth effect tends to be strongest
when statements are related to a subject about which we believe ourselves to be knowledgeable,
and when statements are ambiguous such that they aren’t obviously true or false at first glance. 23
With our perceived biases already in place, we become more or less susceptible to certain
recycled content based on topics that we have a particular investment in.

Rumors work in a similar fashion to the illusory truth effect in which one individual will hear
or interpret something that may not be so and they tell one person who in turn tells two people
and then each one of them tells three people. As more people pass along a bit of information, not
only does the content itself become more distorted – each adding their own “flavor” to the mix –
but eventually they will hear about this information repeatedly from multiple sources until it
becomes a common fact. In attempting to understand more ludicrous claims like Bigfoot or the
Jersey Devil, one sighting isn’t enough for justification. It’s only when enough people begin to
come forward claiming to have seen the same thing, giving credibility to the consistency of a
claim.
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MANDELA EFFECT

There is another particular phenomenon in which distorted memories themselves can alter the
certainty of one's recalling of people and places. The Mandela Effect is the outcome of one
confidently recollecting something differently than how it had actually occurred. Many people
will tell you the mascot on the board game Monopoly wears a monocle or that the monkey from
the children’s book series Curious George has a tail, but neither are in fact true; just to name a
few examples. This term was coined when millions of people around the world were convinced
that the political leader Nelson Mandela was (at the time) deceased; many even recalled seeing
his funeral broadcast on TV. Misconceptions such as these are relatively harmless, but when
such false recollection is attributed to a detail or event that was deliberately distorted for pivoted
political audience reaction, then they can become ultimately damaging and long-lasting.

In 2010, Slate Magazine asked around a thousand of its readers to determine whether they
recalled the authenticity of a photo that was gaining traction online. The photo showcased
Barack Obama shaking hands with the former President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The
picture itself was photoshopped and the event never took place, but 21% of the readers
confirmed and remembered seeing the photo, and 25% said they remembered the event taking
place, but couldn’t directly recall seeing the photo. 24 Even more enlightening, the Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology composed these results seen in Figure 5 that measure the false
memory rates of both the Obama handshake photoshop and one of George W. Bush allegedly
vacationing during the Katrina crisis. Both altered images paint each political leader from
differing political parties in a negative light. As you can see, more liberals recalled the doctored
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memory of Bush than conservatives (34% to 14%), while more conservatives recalled the
doctored memory of Obama than liberals (36% to 26%). Their political biases skewed their
otherwise interpretive, rational thought and implanted a false memory based on the accusations
of a dissenting party.

Figure 5
False Memory Rates by Party Affiliation

Note. Figure taken from Brian Resnick, “We’re underestimating the mind-warping potential of
fake video” Vox Media July 24 2018

The Mandela Effect is further amplified by preconceived assumptions used to rationalize and fill
in the blanks of a distorted memory. Looking back at the phenomena with the Monopoly mascot
and the Curious George monkey, the mascot fits the caricature of a suave, rich tycoon while
George bares a simplistic resemblance to a monkey. Donning a top hat and cane, people
naturally assume that the Monopoly Man wears a monocle as well based on his other notable
accessories. As for George, most simply assume he has a tail given that most known species of
monkeys commonly have tails. Though not majorly common, some species of primates like the
barbary macaques actually have no tail at all.


Neuropsychologists Michael Miller and Michael Gazzaniga conducted an experiment in which
participants were shown several landscape images of various locations, one being a scene from a
beach. Half an hour later, the participants were read a list of items and were asked whether these
items had appeared in the pictures they saw. Participants had recalled seeing items like
umbrellas, beach balls, and sand castles – common staples of beach scenes – when in fact they
were not in the image. Just as the mechanisms of perception are often best revealed by means of
perceptual illusions, the normal mechanisms of memory are often revealed by tricking them into
producing false recollections. 25
But what happens when false recollections become based on more severe profiling and
stereotyping of marginalized groups and ethnic communities? In 2018, Alek Minassian drove a
van through a crowd of people in Toronto Canada, killing ten and injuring dozens more. In the
hours after the event, multiple unreliable eyewitnesses falsely identified him as Middle Eastern
when in fact he was Caucasian. Even worse, the false report gained enough momentum that
reporter Natasha Fatah published an article that referred to Alek as an “angry Middle Eastern”. 26
Despite the article eventually being retracted and corrected, not only did the first, false article
garner more views and shares than the corrected article, but the testimonies of the initial
witnesses remained consistent despite the corrections. Given the statistical quantities of Muslimrelated attacks by vehicle-ramming, witnesses falsely assumed and recalled the ethnicity of the
assailant by repetition association, internal prejudice, or even a combination of the two. Such
false reports and recollections have been detrimental to publishing the correct content online.
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CONFIRMATION BIAS
We have established that those who passionately gravitate toward dissenting extremes display
the tendency to seek information that simply confirms their integrated beliefs and values; this
process is in psychological terms known as the confirmation bias. As observed, those who settle
toward either end of the ideological spectrum are more prone to experiencing this inclination as
they themselves are more inclined to believe that their side is more objectively true rather than
speculatively subjective. In their attempt to justify headstrong beliefs, any sources that support a
position will suffice, including less credible, low-quality news.
The confirmation bias is irrational and thwarts the ability of the individual to maximize utility.
It is the bias most pivotal to ideological extremism and inter and intra-group conflict. 27 Thomas
Hills and Filippo Menczer from the Scientific American observed in their models that in the
abundance of information that is viewed and shared on social media, even when we want to see
and share high-quality information, our inability to view everything in our news feeds (see
Technical Factors) inevitably leads us to share things that are partly or completely untrue. 28
The term “information overload” refers to our inability to properly process the exceedingly
high volume of information we have access to online. With various articles, blogs, and opinion
pieces – each with conflicting views – we often do not have the time or capacity to accurately
quantify and interpret every piece of dissenting information we are given. In order to rationalize
the overflow of data, we allow our cognitive biases to step in and decide where to pivot our
attention toward. The process works as an adjustment of understanding new information so that
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it may fit comfortably in the realm of information that we may already know, reassuring our
biased perspectives on political topics. Humans already adhere to certain biases based on their
environment, so it makes sense to associate believable content with other content we already
perceive to be true.
This does not suggest that we are unequipped to process dissenting information, more so that
the abundance of information stacked up along with it makes such processing difficult; our
biases simply serve as a crutch in dealing with the overload of information we are given.
Information overload impacts the psychological state of information seekers and their behavioral
intention to continue their search 29 which then calls for an adjustment of searches. By this logic,
in a more condensed environment with fewer selections, we would be able to properly interpret
the given content more and make a more accurate decision based on the set given.

ZEIGARNIK EFFECT
In a phenomenon called the Zeigarnik Effect, incomplete experiences are often more
remembered than complete ones. Pioneered by psychologist Bluma Zeigarnik in 1927, she
conducted a series of experiments in which participants were asked to complete a series of tasks
such as puzzles and math problems; half were able to complete their tasks while the other half
were interrupted. When each was asked an hour later what task they were doing, those who had
been interrupted were twice as likely to remember what they had been doing compared to those
who had completed their tasks. Zeigarnik found that adult participants were able to recall their
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unfinished tasks 90% more often than their finished tasks. 30 Typically, we tend to be more
consciously mindful of pending, unfinished business over completed ones. As our mind
constantly attempts to rationalize the environment around us, we seek to close gaps in
information to provide catharsis of pending questions and unresolved endings. Serialized TV
shows have mastered and exploited this technique with what are called “cliffhangers”. When we
become so invested in a story or set of characters, we are driven to learn as much as we can,
especially when an episode ends with an unexpected twist or unresolved turn. How often do you
become so invested in a book or show during versus once it's completed? Unless left with an
influential impact, we are more likely to lose interest or even forget what we were invested in
once we have reached its climax.
Investment doesn’t necessarily mean you have to like or enjoy the content you are consuming,
you just need to hold some level of personal or emotional investment in order to keep you
coming back. In a very peculiar case, there is a subgroup of viewers who “hate-watch” shows.
With the accessibility to binge shows on streaming platforms, it has become common to watch
shows you don’t like all the way to the end. If no enjoyment is being derived from the program,
then why watch? Communications professor Paul Levinson reinforces the emotional aspect of
this phenomenon stating “Once our emotions are unleashed, whether it's because we're very
attracted to something or very repelled by something, if we feel strongly enough about it, we
want to know more.” 31 He furthers his point with the very tabloid-like behavior of news stations
before and during Donald Trump's presidency. Given his rather controversial term, the public
gradually split between idolizing approval or active resentment; either way it kept the people
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talking and it kept them glued to their news feeds. Before the closure of the end of his term, news
stations and political social media content had a rather captive audience invested one way or the
other, providing them with the opportunity to share their both objective and subjective content.
Not just with Trump's presidency, news stories have become ideal outlets for people to latch
onto, particularly stories that have not been officially completed or closed. Once a story has
reached a conclusive end, there is the remedy of closure and our minds will eventually find
another topic to occupy. But when a story is ongoing or ideally never-ending, news stories will
never run short of clicks and views, leaving the consumer to be endlessly updated on the facts,
true or otherwise. A continual story will always have an audience coming back for more.

CONTRAST PRINCIPLE
In Robert Cialdini’s Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, a bulk of the text examines the
effects of what is called the contrast principle, which serves as a significant value in human
perception that affects the way we see the difference between two things that are presented one
after another. Simply put, if the second item is fairly different from the first, we will tend to see it
as more different than it actually is. 32 Individuals and events of significant importance tend to be
perceived as more objectively good or bad when directly compared to another content of
importance. As we’ve explored how consumers already hold consistently biased beliefs and
reinforce them with supported content, belief in such content is increased when the first content
is propped up against a second, more dissenting content. By contrast between these two sources,



5REHUW%&LDOGLQL³,QIOXHQFH7KH3V\FKRORJ\RI3HUVXDVLRQ´+DUSHU&ROOLQV3XEOLVKHUV,QF 


susceptible viewers now not only regard their supported sources as more morally and objectively
true, they now view the dissenting sources as less truthful and more morally wrong.
Dictators have made excellent practice of this principle, propping up their own ideals when
stacked up against a perceived lower ideal by comparison. The Kim family of North Korea
effectively vilifies South Korea in their propaganda, projecting that not only the South has
become corrupt and depleted from capitalistic ideals, but that as bad as things are in the north,
the south is faring much worse. This was an attempt to rationalize and justify the Kim’s
relevance and influence even after their famine in the ’90’s, which nearly killed half the
population. “People were told that their government was stockpiling food to feed the starving
South Korean masses on the blessed day of reunification. They were told that the United States
had instituted a blockade against North Korea that was keeping out food. This was not true, but it
was believable,” 33 as commented by an anonymous North Korean defector. It is not enough to
highlight one value on its own, it must be compared to another that draws a fine line that ergo
identifies the level of quality of the first value.
Mudslinging campaigns during presidential elections work in a very similar fashion by
broadcasting PSA’s that slander the opposing party with truth or fabrications. Articles and
headlines exploit similar techniques through syllogisms making deductive-sounding conclusions
that have no relevant bearing when carefully examined. While it's simple and easy to compare
one number with another number, such comparisons are limited and weak. No comparisons
between only two values can be universal; a simple comparison between the current figure and
some previous value cannot fully capture and convey the behavior of any time series. 34
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Facts of actual quality are based around numerous, sometimes alternating, factors and
perspectives that make up the richness of the full picture that the comparison of only two values
lack. But in an attempt to compartmentalize and filter information to us, we are often
automatically given information and data tailored individually to us that attempt to make us more
satisfied and entertained rather than informed. In the next section, I will discuss the processes
and implementation of social media sites themselves and how their autonomous and automated
mechanisms ultimately spread and cause further susceptibility to disinformation.

TECHNICAL FACTORS
In our ever-evolving globalized world, there is quite literally an endless abundance of online
content used for entertainment, information gathering, and networking. It has now even become
a mandatory requirement in certain businesses for people applying to positions to not only have
an online social media account for work, but also preferably an already pre-existing account to
showcase what kind of person you are to the recruiter. This concentration could serve as its own
case study, scrutinizing the authenticity and believability of online profiles to give the illusion of
ideal candidates, creating its own form of misinformation and deception on the part of the
individual. As noted by cognitive scientist Hugo Mercier, deception is a common trait even in
generally honest people by way of exaggerating their public image and achievements. 35 But here,
we will focus on social media sites themselves and how their implementations and policies
contribute – intentional or not – to the spread of disinformation.
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ONLINE BEHAVIOR
Before we understand the behaviors of the online platforms which house misinformed content,
it is necessary to first understand the behavior of online users themselves. As previously
established, the majority of the general population seek their daily news not just online, but on
social media platforms specifically; platforms that house more disinformation than other online
sites or sources. According to Katerina Eva Matsa and Mason Walker, nearly half of U.S. adults
get their news from social media over cable and online news platforms combined. In their study
conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2021, it was discovered that around 48% of the 11,178
adults surveyed use social media as a form of news consumption, most notably from the social
networking service Facebook. Of the collected adults surveyed, 31% got their news from
Facebook, 22% from YouTube, 13% from Twitter, and 11% from Instagram. 36
Laura Ceci from Statista, estimated that as of 2019 Facebook was still consecutively the most
popular social networking app used for news consumption in the United States with an average
of 169.76 million users 37 with a dominating 63% of global active usage as of 2020. (YouTube
ranked shortly behind at 61%, making Facebook and YouTube the only online sites to breach the
50% majority compared to other social media sites). 38 Among the most notable of social media
sites notorious for the spread of disinformation, Facebook is consistently ranked the greatest
proprietor of fake news sources with YouTube once again at a close second.
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Andrew M. Guess, Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler from Nature: Human Behavior tracked
the internet use of over 3,000 Americans leading up to the 2016 US election. Facebook users
were found to be referred and led to false or untrustworthy news sources over 15% of the time
while on the platform. By contrast, users were referred by Facebook to more trustworthy news
sites only 6% of the time. The authors concluded that compared to that of Google (3.3%) and
Twitter (1%), Facebook is by far the worst perpetrator when it comes to spreading fake news. 39
Now that we’ve established which social media sites to be the most untrustworthy, we now
turn to a trend-pattern fact sheet by the Pew Research Center in 2021 to break down who is most
exposed to false news on these sites. To begin broadly and then narrow down, the number of US
adults who admitted to frequently using at least one social media site was a mere 5% back in
2005. With the advancement and implementation of technology and newly founded popular
social media sites, that estimate rose to 72% in 2021. Within the 2005-2021 timespan, all of the
different age demographics rose in social media use; but while those aged 65 and older went
from 3% to 45%, the 18-29 age range went from 7% to a staggering 84%. Since 2013, Facebook
has consistently remained the most popular site, with 70% of the 18-29 age range still logging
into that site. 40
With online activity being the most popular among younger demographics, they have therefore
become the most ideal candidates for exposure and susceptibility to disinformation. Their
vulnerability is greatly affected not just by mere exposure to false news alone, but by their
excessive use and dependence on online activity itself. The increasing dependency of both online
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activity and presence, making it more of a driving factor in our everyday lives being either for
work or leisure, has greatly affected our cognitive abilities in both focus and performance. It is
justified to say that an entire generation of younger viewers have become absolutely hooked to
their phones and by extension online media with both being as accessible as they are in this
modern day.
Professor of Marketing at NYU Stern School of Business Adam Alter, discusses in his
analytical publication Irresistible: The Rise of Addictive Technology and the Business of Keeping
Us Hooked, the very serious and detrimental tolls online activity and social media have had on
its users. According to his studies, up to 40% of the population suffers from some form of
internet-based addiction. 41 One chapter scrutinized a recent study by Microsoft who asked young
adults to focus their attention on a string of numbers and letters that appeared on a computer
screen. At the end of the session, those who spent less time on social media ended up faring
better at the task. When asked about their online activity, the participants stated that they all
spent an average of five to seven hours online a day. To stress the dependency of online activity
further, 91% of respondents described their phones as “extensions of their brains” with the
majority saying they would search online for answers to questions before trying to generate an
answer from memory. 42
As the stimuli saturating our lives continue to grow more intricate and variable, we have to
depend increasingly on our shortcuts to handle them all. 43 The increased excess and extremes of
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behavioral addiction add to the dependency of increased online behavior and thus, exposure and
susceptibility to disinformation.
In the data-heavy publication, Everybody Lies: Big Data, New Data, and What The Internet
Can Tell Us About Who We Really Are by Seth Stephens Davidowitz, there is a heavy
concentration on the targeted focus towards impressionable youths online. Ages 14-24 are
regarded as key, crucial periods by which the most influential imprints are often cemented into
ones shaping of moral and ideological character. It is statistically during this time period that
Americans will habitually form their political views based on the popularity of the current
president. A popular Republican or unpopular Democrat will influence many young adults to
become Republicans, while an unpopular Republican or popular Democrat puts this
impressionable group in the Democratic column. 44 With the highest amount of misinformation
being generated from political-related content, it is all the more likely that those within this
impressionable time period coupled with their overconsumption of online content will
undoubtedly lead toward more biased views based on skewed news and data.

ALGORITHMS
From Google to Facebook to YouTube, online search engines and websites rely on carefully
constructed and maintained algorithms and data filters. Algorithms follow specific calculations
and problem-solving operations to properly quantify the endless streams of data that are fed into
their inputs every single day. When we search for something online, every word and every letter
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typed into the search engine is stored away and added to the already complex filters made in an
attempt to help find the best possible results you are ideally searching for.
Through a process called “deep learning”, the search engines gradually become more accurate
in predicting and recommending content and results; simply put, the more data the engine has to
work off of, the more precise its answers can be. In specific search engines like Google, billions
upon billions of data have already been fed into its algorithms which allows itself to make
predictions and recommendations of what you are searching for. Often for these types of search
engines, they tend to cater to the most widely mainstream results or what is considered
“trending” at that moment. But in more personalized sites such as Facebook, Instagram, and
YouTube, they become eerily accurate based on the profile of yourself that you have given them
through your personal information and activity. Through a deep learning algorithm catered
directly to you, the engine learns specifically from what data you feed it; search with a specific
keyword and your results will apply toward those specific keywords even if they don’t mean the
same of what you intend or even its context.
The purpose of these algorithms is to find out what kind of person you are and then present you
with content that it thinks you would like the most. To do this, it must filter through so much
data and content so that it may bring into surface-level view the content you wish to find buried
under all of that data. But in doing so, as certain content is surfaced to you, others are buried and
left unseen. As we’ve established, people are already predetermined to hold pre-existing biases
and beliefs that are much harder to crack and are more polarizing when they are politically
based. So it is of no surprise that more left-leaning individuals will search for more left-leaning
content and vice-versa. In doing so, the algorithms contribute to the catering and reinforcement
of our already confirmed beliefs (see Confirmation Bias).


Search engines and social media platforms provide personalized recommendations based on
the vast amounts of data they have about users' past preferences. They prioritize information in
our feeds that we are most likely to agree with—no matter how fringe—and shield us from
information that might change our minds. 45 As users continue to search for content solely to
confirm their biases, the algorithms make dissenting or opposing content less likely to appear in
their fields and results. At the alarming rates that individuals spend online in a given week, those
hours are spent being exposed to only agreeable content that gradually makes users more
susceptible to content that is less likely to be truthful.
A more disturbing factor is the algorithm's ability to mimic a user’s prejudices and biases along
with their tastes and preferences. Studies have shown that algorithms learn less pleasant
associations for traditionally African American names than for traditionally European American
names. They learn the same kinds of biases that have been measured in humans without ever
being explicitly told about them. 46 One AI program was tasked with creating a review for a
Mexican restaurant all on its own; the result was a scathingly negative review. Pondering why,
the experimenters realized the AI had utilized word associations to complete its sentences and
based on the datasets accessible from the web, the word “Mexican” was most associated with the
word “illegal”. They don’t know that imitating biases is wrong, they just know that this is a
pattern that helps them achieve their goal. 47
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SHOCK AND AWE
Social media sites are a business and unfortunately are more concerned with making the
customer satisfied and happy above all else. The amount of clicks, views, likes, and shares
generates revenue for both the corporations and affiliated content creators. As long as creators
follow the designated user guidelines from each site, they can for the most part get away with
some pretty alarming material. Facebook, “for example,” has a set of community standards and
policy details that are made to detect and remove hateful and inflammatory content or those that
may cause imminent physical harm. They draw a very fine line between that is considered
factual and what is considered “hate speech.” However, when it comes to defining terms of
misinformation, Facebook's Policy Rationale admits:
“The world is changing constantly, and what is true one minute
may not be true the next minute. People also have different levels
of information about the world around them, and may believe
something is true when it is not. A policy that simply prohibits
“misinformation” would not provide useful notice to the people
who use our services and would be unenforceable, as we don’t
have perfect access to information.” 48

Because there is a very blurred line between truth and false from the rationalizations and
perspectives of its users, it complicates what can be flagged and blocked under the fair use of
content uploaded. With this leeway, there is now an open window for users to maliciously or
unintentionally upload and spread false content that has not been properly fact-checked.
While processes are being made to address and improve these kinds of policies, much content
becomes fair game. Because these social platforms act like the business that it is, creators
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become fluent in generating views and likes in a very similar manner. Much like news stations,
creators understand the “novelty” of dressing up their content to stand out to be the most
appealing or alarming amid the flood of other content to click on. Much “clickbait” content relies
on surface-level gimmicks like misleading titles and thumbnails, which can exploit the merits of
vagueness through what is known as the “relevance theory” in which a linguistic sense of words
and sentences are used not to encode what the speaker means but merely to indicate it in a
precise way but with room for interpretation. 49
But others understand the emotional incentive to drive views and shares. To see what types of
political messages were more likely to be shared, scientists in 2019 ran a test and found on
Twitter that tweets with more emotive and moral words were more likely to be retweeted and
that all voters responded more to words showing moral outrage. 50 Because of the strong
receptive nature of emotional stimuli, content that plays on people's emotions rather than ‘facts’
are proven to generate more attention.
A similar test was run in 2018 that showed that playing on the emotion of fear works the most
when garnering attention. Dread risk—involving uncontrollable, fatal, involuntary, and
catastrophic outcomes (e.g., terrorist attacks and nuclear accidents)—may be particularly
susceptible to amplification because of the psychological biases inherent in dread risk
avoidance. 51
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YouTube is especially effective in exploiting the emotional responses of its users not just from
the content provided, but from the implementation of video over text. According to research,
video is a more potent tool than text for spreading ideas because it more effectively stays in
one’s memory. The brain processes video 60,000 times faster than it does text. 52 Because of this,
as well as its leniency in policies, YouTube is notably infamous for its amount of defamation and
conspiracy theories its site holds. Alongside its tailored recommendation algorithms, YouTube
has an ‘Auto-Play’ function where – unless manually disabled – will automatically play the next
video in its recommendation feed. As stated before, these filters aren’t perfect, so oftentimes
YouTube will recommend and – if you let it – play a marathon of videos that may slowly but
surely lead to alarming and often misinforming content that lies under the surface of YouTube’s
more mainstream videos. Mozilla asked YouTube users about the times they felt as if the
algorithm suggested extreme content and thousands responded about the eventual content they
were led to. From searching simple dance videos that led to videos about bodily harm to selfesteem videos that transitioned eventually to anti-Semitic content. 53
Every time a video plays it is considered a view, regardless of whether the user has watched
the entire thing or not; prompting the algorithm to think that you are enjoying the content based
on the views, prompting it further to recommend related content. As much as users have reported
and complained about the disturbing and wrongful content on these sites, it is regardless
considered a win because they are still generating viewership revenue; the more alarming and
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shocking the content is, the more it gets people talking; preying on the emotions of viewers to
spread disinformation.

MALICIOUS ACTORS
Many online users and content creators more often create and spread misinformation which
explained earlier is a degree of misinformed information and sources that are mainly spread
through the same degrees of misinformed people who may not even know what they are
spreading is false; not always, but often. Disinformation involves the intentional spread of
blatantly false information to achieve some sort of objective or agenda. These sources and
creators are much more sinister online players who seek to misinform the public for personal,
political, and economic gain. They know exactly how to exploit the political, psychological, and
technical factors explored thus far here and many more. While there are many creators and users
who spread their own share of disinformation, many in this category are independent lone
wolves or “trolls” who merely seek to stir the online pot. This branch of users has indeed caused
detrimental outcomes and deserves its own case study, but here we will instead focus on more
powerful online actors who effectively thrive on a grander scale through disinformation.
The government of Russia has an active state-sponsored “Russian web brigade” whose sole
task is to work round the clock to flood Russian internet forums, social networks and the
comments sections of western publications with remarks praising Vladimir Putin, and raging at
the depravity and injustice of the west. 54 . They have gradually become sophisticated in their
tactics of undermining their own citizens and other foreign powers. There have been irrefutable
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effects of Russian collusion during the US 2016 and 2020 elections with the National
Intelligence Council having “high confidence” 55 that President Vladimir Putin took extensive
action in attempts to undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process through
disinformation strategies. Russia’s interference activities have exploited vulnerabilities in the
information ecosystem, cyberspace, and the global financial system, and used the openness and
transparency of democratic societies against both sides of the Atlantic. 56
Very recently their intelligence entities have been targeting Ukraine, spreading disinformation
and propaganda in an attempt to paint Ukraine in a bad light in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine
conflict. Such measures are intended to influence Western countries into believing Ukraine’s
behavior could provoke a global conflict and convince Russian citizens of the need for Russian
military action in Ukraine. 57 False stories have included that Ukraine and Ukrainian government
officials are the aggressors in the Russia-Ukraine relationship, the west is pushing Ukraine
toward a conflict, and that Russia’s deployment of combat forces is a mere repositioning of
troops on its own territory.
The People’s Republic of China implements its own similar and insidious cabinet called the
“50 Cent Party” who utilize social media to manipulate public opinion and disseminate proChinese Communist Party propaganda. The American Political Science Review estimated that
the “50 Cent Party” fabricates around 488 million social media posts annually. 58 Similarly to
Russia, China exploits their online propaganda domestically and internationally. Their
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government has orchestrated cyber-attacks and invested in campaigns to “tell China’s story
well” 59 that regularly resorts to manipulated narratives and disinformation. China’s main
campaign narratives as of late have been the attempt to distort the origins of the coronavirus
pandemic. China engaged in significant efforts to suppress early reports of the virus, from
censoring coverage to arresting whistleblowers. Initial Chinese media coverage of the virus
focused on the positives of Beijing’s response and refrained from displacing the blame to the
extent that Chinese reporting confirmed the Wuhan Seafood Market as the origin of the
outbreak. 60
Note the patterns of behavior prevalent in the styles of disinformation Russia and China are
implementing. They pivot attention away from themselves and toward hot-button issues to incite
an emotional reaction from the targeted masses. As noted in the Zeigarnik effect, users are more
likely to be attached and invested in current, developing stories that have yet to be resolved. This
is the ripe moment for them to strike, exploiting and flooding pages and accounts with false
information, using precise hashtags and keywords that will be filtered into the feeds of
susceptible users. By extension, the contrast principle aids the investment of the Zeigarnik effect
by having the novelty of vilifying a certain state or group; this case being the United States and
Ukraine. By painting a clear-cut us-versus-them mentality, the information becomes all the more
accessible and digestible.
Powerful non-state actors have also utilized social media for their benefit. Extremist groups
and terrorist organizations have been notorious for using social media to enlist and indoctrinate
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people domestic and overseas into their cause. The National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ran a series of datasets in 2018 and found that Facebook
was the most commonly used platform by extremists with nearly 65% using Facebook for
radicalization or mobilization between 2005 and 2016. As expected, YouTube was the second
most used platform with a usage rate of 31%. Islamist extremists were by a large margin the
group most likely to engage with social media as a primary means of consuming extremist
content or communicating with other extremists. 61
Several factors and variables play a role in how extremist groups and powerful state actors are
able to exploit social media policy loopholes and get away with propaganda and violent content.
One such case is the unfortunate lack of proper reaction time to recognize and pull extremist
content, one such example was when a gunman opened fire on a mosque in New Zealand in 2019
and livestreamed his attack on Facebook. The platform responded by deleting the gunman’s
account shortly after the incident, but the damage was already done; by then it had already been
recorded, copied, and released back on Facebook and other social media accounts. In a 15minute window, members from the Reuters Institute found five copies of the footage on
YouTube uploaded under the search term “New Zealand” and tagged with categories including
“education” and “people & blogs”. In another case, the video was shared by a verified Instagram
user in Indonesia with more than 1.6 million followers. 62 This unfortunately showcases how
quickly such content can have longevity online once it has been uploaded with the platform
providing such easy access to express and share hateful ideologies. In less extreme cases, more
subtle and textualized forms of disinformation are able to bypass platform policies by
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convincingly juxtaposing their false information amidst truthful ones. In 2020, researchers from
the Reuters Institute tracked online engagement, comparing totally fabricated information with
reconfigured information; information that is mostly true, but contains nuggets of falsity. Judging
from the social media data collected, reconfigured content saw higher engagement than content
that was wholly fabricated. 63 In short, the most powerful types of lies are ones that have a hint of
truth in them.

ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS
In review of everything we have examined, disinformation itself and in-turn susceptibility to its
content is driven by various factors and variables that alter and coincide with one another to
make its believability and susceptibility all the more potent. As we’ve seen, politically-driven
disinformation is vastly the most widely spread and used by state and nonstate actors for the
purpose of altering perception and driving certain ideas and agendas. The degree of party leaning
affects and distorts one's ability to view and obtain political content objectively, and this
polarization is clearly exploited by certain ideologically-leaning media outlets. The biases of
political polarization are driven and reinforced by cognitive and psychological factors that
confirm biases, distort memories, and hinder rational comparisons of online content. The online
content itself is filtered and tailored to users based on sophisticated augmented algorithms, deep
learning, and policies and drive disinformation into recommendation homepages and bury more
authentic content. The filtering of what users see and don’t see coupled with information
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overload and repetition only reinforces the more negative tendencies and behaviors of online
activity. These separate but compatible political, psychological, and technical factors all play
distinctive roles in spreading disinformation. As such, no universal policy nor strategy will
completely eradicate disinformation and thus susceptibility to it. Each must be tackled head-on in
its own way that will also similarly be compatible with each other in combating susceptibility.
By narrowing all of these complex factors into more digestible compartmentalized features, each
can be tackled more usefully head-on. If political, psychological, and technical factors are causal
factors, then it would be ideal to focus on certain concentrated policies, platforms, and behaviors
as ways to make a noticeable change.
Fortunately, online disinformation hasn’t captured the minds of all users nor gone completely
unnoticed. A nationwide survey by Statista in 2021 found that 74% of participants agreed that
false or misleading information should be completely removed from social media platforms. 64
Brooke Auxier from the Pew Research Center in 2020 found that 54% of participants agreed that
political advertisements should not be allowed on social media platforms and a much larger 77%
found it not very or not at all acceptable for social media companies to use data about their users’
online activities to show them ads from political campaigns. 65 Another study by the Pew
Research Center in 2021 found that 59% of adults agreed that technology companies should take
steps to restrict misinformation online, even if it puts some restrictions on Americans’ ability to
access and publish content. 66 A notable footnote in this study found that 70% of Republicans
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said that the freedoms of publishing content should be protected, even if it means allowing some
false information to be published while 65% of Democrats said that the government should take
steps to restrict false information, even if it means limiting freedom of information. Even certain
leading pioneers of social media companies have been vocal of their ultimately destructive
nature. Chamath Palihapitiya, former vice president for user growth for Facebook stated “the
short-term, dopamine-driven feedback loops that we have created are destroying how society
works. No civil discourse, no cooperation, misinformation, mistruth.” 67 So this much is clear: the
people have spoken!

POLICIES
Some steps are already being taken in response to the flood of disinformation overflowing
social media pages. Twitter currently fully prohibits the promotion of political content on its site
for the time being. As of the writing of this thesis, business magnate Elon Musk bought the
company for forty-four billion dollars, a move which has been explicitly conditioned as a
critique of Twitter’s censorship policies. 68 While he makes his conditions for Twitter to “adhere
to free speech principles”, 69 we will gradually see how he goes about defining those principles
when they exist in different, alternating contexts
Meanwhile, Facebook and YouTube implement authorization processes that require advertisers
and publishers to complete a checklist of requirements and entails that their content contains no
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blatant falseness or upfront biased candidate leanings during upcoming elections. There have
however been some exceptions, such as when Facebook temporarily lifted its ban to allow some
advertisers to run political issue and candidacy ads in Georgia in December 2020. These
platforms have taken further steps to moderate microtargeting from political advertisements who
generally reach specific groups of users based on their geographical location and personal
interests.
To combat this, Facebook utilizes a similar filtering of a classification system to categorize
users’ preferences and pivot their dissenting content. This would make sense being that most
disinformation is political-based, but this exacerbates the bigger problem of eliminating
dissenting content from users’ feeds. This may hinge opposing biased content, but the approach
should filter a more balanced array of content that should be encouraged. This is an example of a
technical factor issue being regarded as a political factor issue. The focus is on political content
being lumped together as grounds for exclusion when the focus should be on the tech being used
and how it is affecting what users see. Strategies become more accessible when they are more
accurately approached and when, for example, the more complicated political aspect is
separated.
Facebook has taken technical steps in removing more obvious derogatory content where in
2016 Facebook launched “Deeptext”, an AI-based tool used to combat online trolling and hate
speech. According to a 2017 article on the algorithmic arbiter, it helped the company delete over
60,000 hateful posts a week. 70 This is an excellent step in the right direction where tech
implementation has been more effective than policy reworkings. California for example, passed a
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law in 2019 against using deepfakes for porn and for manipulating videos of political candidates
near an election, 71
But how effective will this be in the long run in an age where manipulating technology doubles
in advancement every year while policies can take twice as long to take effect? Many laws are
currently already implemented at the state and federal levels around the world to crack down on
the misuse of technology on social media, but they end up being ineffective or too vague and
open for opportunistic interpretation such as Facebook's Policy Rationale (see Shock and Awe).

PLATFORMS
Examples like Facebook’s classification system for its handling and filtering of content
demonstrates the need to tweak some of the less desirable functions of the social platforms site
and its augmented algorithms. We’ve discussed the damaging effects of artificial intelligence
(A.I.) and its filtering and catering of information exclusively for each user (see Algorithms).
Many people and governments are worrying about technology's potential for creating fake but
damaging videos, like realistic yet fake videos of a politician saying something inflammatory. 72
Realistic AI-driven fakes like the Obama photoshop (see Mandela Effect) are only the
beginning and are becoming more sophisticated and genuinely lifelike as technology advances
with each passing year. As such, they need to be routinely updated and kept in check like any
other functioning mechanism to avoid pitfalls like the spread of disinformation; the algorithms
need to be fixed. A very important factor to keep in mind is that algorithms and AI itself don’t
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generate false and hateful content all on its own. Modern models and especially primitive
training models need to be physically fed data into its input by its developers, aka humans. Early
developmental tests go through hundreds of trials and errors, gathering millions upon millions of
data to sort through. Due to the plethora of objective and subjective data out there, AI developers
need to juggle the right balance between too much and too little data. In other words, algorithms
will only learn that you feed it, and need to be taught in very literal terms; example being that if I
fed an AI “2+2=”, I must explicitly lay the ground rules of addition and state that two two’s
make four, or else it will only tell me that I have two twos. Algorithms filter and sort through
such information and data through word and numerical associations that will gradually make
predictive shortcuts the more it correlates new data with existing data, which explains why less
than flattering terms are lumped together with more marginalized groups. An algorithm is only
as good and useful as its creator and what they feed it; if an AI is in the hands of a biased or
incompetent developer, it will learn the wrong information. Since we’ve established that humans
are predetermined to harbor biased thoughts, those biases can unconsciously and detrimentally
spill into their algorithms if left unchecked. That’s why you’ll get algorithms that learn that racial
and gender discrimination are handy ways to imitate the humans in their datasets. It’s up to the
programmer to supply the ethics and the common sense 73 The best way to clean the muddied
datasets would be to thoroughly train well-rounded and reflective developers who can gather
factual data objectively. The transparency of an individual’s online information and profiles will
in fact come in handy in hiring and training people who we will get to know from their public
voice and activity. In order to filter and train the right algorithms, it is apparent to filter and train
the right people. Even now, companies implement and offer training such as Google Cloud’s
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“Machine Learning and artificial intelligence”; 74 an online course that offers technical insight
into operating tools such as BigQuery, TensorFlow, and Cloud Vision. This is an excellent
starting point in allowing citizens to become fluent in relevant applications. Better training of
individuals is a recommendation that I will extend in the next section.
In an attempt to discourage users from accessing false information, certain social media
platforms have taken it upon themselves to flag such content if removal is out of their control.
But as we’ve seen from researchers Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, such labeling and
exposure hits users with the ‘backfire effect’ (see Political Polarization). This results in the very
opposite intent of flagging content; instead of keeping people away, will persuade them to seek
such content instead. Even worse, the increasing distrust in government and privatized
businesses in the United States encourages and leads users to believe the flagging of such content
is a conspiracy to silence “the truth” from the public. This tactic only exacerbates susceptibility
even further.
In the biased and opinionated environments made possible by online echo chambers, it is sadly
no longer enough to flag or refute certain content as false; new steps need to be taken if possible
and accessible. For sites like Instagram and Facebook, a user is hit with a pop-up block if they
happen to come across flagged content, a common example can be seen in Figure 6. The
headline transparently states that the content in question contains false data which gives the user
the option to follow the page anyway, go back, or to ‘learn more’ which will lead the user to
information about the platform's fact-checking program. This approach merely acknowledges the
flagging of the content but still allows the user to access it; the only viable source to go by is the
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link in the description which gives an account in vague terms about the program, not the content.
Much like how politically biased users gravitate toward similar like-minded individuals, and
much like how people normally associate confirmation and trust with familiar people and groups,
the information provided is a cold, unfamiliar hindrance on the senses of familiarity and trust.
Figure 6

Sample of Typical Pop-Up Block

Note. Figure taken from Company News “Taking Action Against People Who Repeatedly Share
Misinformation” Meta May 26, 2021

With the general public aware of the presence of misinformation as well as the collective
mistrust of a platform many know to harbor misinformation, why should users take the program's
word when they say this content is false? The fact-checking program is by association an
extension of the already mistrusted platform which renders explanations and elaborations as
rather mute. Similar to how developers of AI should be thoroughly trained before hiring, users
should instead be sent to profiles and websites of those professionals who have flagged the
content. In addition to their credentials, an array of alternative pages and sites that backup their
case and ideally refute the false content in question will give users something to properly chew
on and interpret instead of simply being told something is false; back that up with evidence and


alternatives that demonstrate how false the content really is. As we’ve learned from the contrast
principle, one value alone cannot objectively represent a position, perspective, or explanation. In
order to sway users in the right direction, they must be pivoted and compared with diverse and
alternative information.
In a society that celebrates individuality, U.S. citizens don’t want to be told what is right and
wrong, they want the obtainable freedom to create their own realities and form their own
conclusions. A single refuting of a page’s content will not leave enough interpretation open; by
providing an array of alternative sources – preferably ten or more – users will then assume the
perspective of control and draw their own conclusions from the facts given. A more thorough
analysis and experiment would be ideal to properly test this theory. It may not be 100% effective,
but I believe this tactic will improve the chances of users believing in the right information.

BEHAVIORS
In junction to altering online behavior as a result, let it serve as a functional strategy and cause
as well. By changing users’ behaviors online, the very cognitive functions that have been used to
ensnare people toward false information may also serve as tools to deliver more positive opposite
effects. The best advice one could give to keep people from succumbing to online disinformation
on social media platforms would be to just not be online at all, or at the very least not rely on
social media as news and instead seek out more objective and fact-based media. Total
disassembling from online activity and social media is very likely a pipe dream whose chances
dwindle every year as we integrate online activity into our lives further and further. Instant
connectivity, convenience, and even requirements from certain career applications is too much of


a temptation – or even gamble – to give up entirely. We don’t need to be rash and completely
eradicate internet use from our lives, but a conscious effort to limit our screen time – not just
from the internet – will benefit us in the long run in a plethora of ways.
Countless studies have found excessive TV and internet use to affect memory, posture, sleep,
weight, and cognitive function. We’ve explored how prolonged use has affected the
performances of younger demographics (see Online Behavior) and how excessive use allows
repetitive exposure to false information that gradually becomes convincing over time (see
Illusory Truth Effect). By limiting the amount of online consumption, we will begin to
experience positive changes that will gradually slide into diminished susceptibility.
In a comparison of reading books vs. watching TV, reading calms the nerves, increases
language and reasoning, and can even keep you mentally alert as you age. TV, on the other hand,
has the opposite effect. 75 Reading is a more active activity while TV is generally passive and
demands very little effort in consuming its content. As such, memory and performance are
affected which as we’ve demonstrated increases susceptibility. When we exercise our brains and
cognitive functions into more demanding situations, they adapt and grow like any other muscle
in our body. Such exercises support us into adapting healthier decisions and lifestyles; and as our
performance and memory improve, we will then become more utilized to reflectively critically
think about certain online content. Our improved memory and rationalizations from limiting
online use will make users less receptive to misinformation.
This exercise in critical thinking serves as an added bonus when consuming dissenting content.
By allowing ourselves to be challenged by opposite views we can engage in the reflective
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abilities of experiencing and emphasizing both sides of an argument. One must not have to agree
with a dissenting view but understanding it allows one to properly deconstruct how true and false
news emerge and evolve as they do.
Researcher Hugo Mercier and cognitive scientist Dan Sperber provide the benefits and pitfalls
of such rationality in their incredibly recommended 2017 publication, The Enigma of Reason.
Their studies argue that when individuals proceed to understand and rationalize a question,
decision, or dilemma independently, we follow an “intuitive inference” in which we generate
hypotheses from the sensory data applied to us exclusively. This “data” is unique to each of us as
we come to such rationales bestowed to us from nature and nurture outlets. Mercier and Sperber
argue that we are not truly bound by formal and rational norms because reason in and of itself is
biased and opportunistic whose sole purpose is for the individual to come to terms and
understand a situation in their own way. The conclusion may not coincide with what is truly or
objectively happening or may not even have a true grasp on reality; as such, our reasons can be
misleading and lead us astray from what is true. Mercier and Sperber opt for an “interactionist
approach” to reason. People end up formulating better, more pointed arguments in the back-andforth of a dialogue than when reasoning on their own. 76 People may think that those who
disagree with them are irrational, but how rational is it to think that only you and the people who
agree with you are rational? 77
Our biases and reinforcements of beliefs often lead us to believe that we ourselves are the most
rational and morally justified, but such intuitive inferences only strengthen our distortions of
reality. As heated as dissent may be, and no matter how uncomfortable opposing sides may be to
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one's self-esteem and ego, it is a healthy variable for the overall betterment of one's mental
health, critical thinking, and self-reflection. We should actively rail against the comfort zones of
“yes-men” who merely reinforce what we want to hear, we should be challenged and even taken
aback from opposing ideas and viewpoints which serve to strengthen our capacity to understand.
Oftentimes, those “yes-men” are the very actors who exploit and manipulate context for their
own gain, and should be recognized as such. If this approach and attitude is actively exercised
and reinforced, we will improve not just our rationalizations, but our ability to not be
undermined by disinformation.
In one of several electoral reform propositions, political scientists Bruce Ackerman and James
Fishkin have proposed what they call a “Deliberation Day” in which registered voters would be
invited to partake in public community discussions regarding upcoming elections. Such an
approach is a step in the right direction to get dissenting extremes to cooperate. In searching for
the truth, it may be our best plan to start by criticizing our most cherished beliefs. 78
As stated earlier, these alternatives are recommended to be exercised and practiced by a much
larger portion of the general population in order to combat susceptibility to disinformation.
Formal training and education need to be at the forefront of related concentrations and
curriculums. It is important for the average citizen to become familiar and fluent in not just the
causal variables but proposed tactics and solutions. But in no other demographic is it more urgent
and required than in journalists and surveyors of media.
Amy Watson of Statista interviewed a vast array of journalists in 2019 and were questioned in
both their natural ability to spot disinformation and what related formal training they’ve had
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from their organizations and institutions. The results showed that the vast majority of responding
journalists stated that they had not taken part in any formal training regarding the spread of false
information, with just 15% saying that they had been trained in this area and 81% not formally
trained. 79 In the era of disinformation saturating our newsfeed and lives, this is an unacceptable
estimate. Technology companies and the firms in their orbit should require all employees to pass
a course on potential misuses of technology. 80
As long as computer literacy has become an integrated part of education, so must literacy in
understanding the contingencies that much more citizens and journalists need to be more aware
and fluent in. Fellow journalist and assistant professor Samuel C. Woolley supports a similar
form of transdisciplinary leadership and education, calling for scientists who understand social
problems and policymakers who understand technology. We need public interest technologists
and technologically savvy politicians. 81 Much like how we need citizens who emphasize and
identify with both sides of an argument, we need experts fluent in a variety of fields; this should
be apparent in such an integrated and globalized world that we live in. Diverse groups and
individuals with various backgrounds and fields that open opportunities for different perspectives
and interpretations which prevent like-minded echo chambers. The very different and diverse
avenues of causal factors elaborated here in this text reinforces how truly complex and
multilayered tackling a situation such as this is. Only when we engage and become fluent in
multiple avenues can we draw more neutral and objective rationalizations and conclusions.
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CONCLUSION
In an analysis of our findings in the literature review, we have deduced not only the
overwhelming evidence of the existence and spread of disinformation, but the versatile ways in
which they affect users as well. The multilayered embodiment of these forces is crucial in
understanding the complexity and severity of the situation. By deconstructing and
compartmentalizing the factors and notable findings as we have, we can grasp a better
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the evidence and theories proposed in
them.
The polls and figures quantified by the Pew Research Center and the Gallup World
Poll (see Figure 1) showcase the distinct polarization and distrust between the two dominant
political parties in the United States. Despite notable distrust and contrasting ideologies between
the two even beforehand, it seems too great a coincidence that distrust and polarization increased
in annual sizes around the same time as the most contemporary and influential social media
platforms as recorded by Our World in Data. (see Figure 2) As they have evolved in
sophistication, these social platforms have become havens for hive minds of ideological
extremes to reinforce their dissent and remain in unquestioned echo chambers that are filtered
and tailored by faulty algorithms.
The findings of Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber suggest that interactionist approaches to
confrontations and dissent can help alleviate the tensions of polarization, but prove to be rather
tricky in an online setting as proven by Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler’s backfire effect
theory. Other psychological phenomena such as Temple University’s illusory truth effect, Fiona
Broome’s Mandel effect, and Bluma Zeigarnik’s Zeigarnik effect all demonstrate the
ramifications of mental barriers and defense mechanisms that are amplified in an online social



setting. The psychological and technical factors that spread disinformation are relentlessly
compatible and effective in increasing susceptibility.
The studies of Katrina Eva Matsa and Mason Walker from the Pew Research Center and Laura
Ceci from Statista prove the increased activity and reliance of social media and online use for
social interaction and news consumption. The studies of Adam Alter showcase that memory,
rationality, and performance are severely disrupted by online dependency, making susceptibility
all the more likely.
Those who have the most to gain from the exploitation of these factors are often malicious
state actors and extremists who seek to disrupt, undermine, and indoctrinate the masses. The
factors that sow and spread disinformation have been effectively weaponized by these
individuals and organizations and the severe lack of sufficient countering has brought about
detrimental consequences.
Although such advances have disrupted society, they can still be used for good. Despite the
rather controversial stances in recent years, globalization and integration have arguably had more
positive effects on the world’s population. Thanks to its celebration of progress and technology,
civilization and society have evolved unprecedentedly faster than any century prior, which has
led to an acceleration and accessibility in food production, trade, technology, health and
medicine, societal development, and communication most of all. Critics and scholars have
criticized and scrutinized the online world for making our Earth a much smaller place, with the
internet and social media providing instant connectivity to family, friends, and a never-ending
ocean of information. This tool is no different than any other technological achievement in
history in that for all of the positive results, there have been negative repercussions as well when
this tool is mistreated or abused. This compilation and observation of theories, experiments, and


publications have demonstrated the strong effect that the misuse of these tools have had on
multiple layers of fields and concentrations and have permeated the perceptual view of reality
that citizens often take for granted. It is paramount to use these instruments of communication to
spread the word and the right information. Because our world has become so small and
integrated, this relationship has made stability more fragile than ever before. Misinformation,
disinformation, fake news, and propaganda have had very serious and destructive consequences.
It has affected our elections and caused massive political rifts in our communities, it has lowered
the optimal happiness of online users, it has led to the highest estimate in unvaccinated children
in history thereby spreading more illnesses, it led to the persecution and mass genocide of Jews
in Nazi Germany and of the Tutsi population in Rwanda, it has indoctrinated otherwise educated
individuals into joining violent extremist and terrorist organizations, it has allowed regimes like
North Korea to continually oppress and isolate its people, and it has saturated our news feeds and
algorithms with negative and hateful content.
If we are to continue to have a harmonious relationship with online activity and technology, we
must become that much more aware and critical of the dangers that it could wield. We’ve
explored its capacity to affect users politically, psychologically, and technically. It is all the more
reason to come up with policy, platform, and behavior-based solutions in order to recognize,
combat, and minimize susceptibility to online disinformation. If we productively break up their
causal factors accordingly, we can tackle each field each in its own way to come up with viable
solutions that will hopefully and in theory cross and saturate into each other and finally close the
gap that only seems to open each passing year.
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